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Puncturable Signatures and Applications in
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Xin-Yu Li, Jing Xu, Xiong Fan, Yu-Chen Wang and Zhen-Feng Zhang
Abstract—Proof-of-stake blockchain protocols are becoming one of the most promising alternatives to the energy-consuming
proof-of-work protocols. However, one particularly critical threat in the PoS setting is the well-known long-range attacks caused by
secret key leakage (LRSL attack). Specifically, an adversary can attempt to control/compromise accounts possessing substantial stake
at some past moment such that double-spend or erase past transactions, violating the fundamental persistence property of blockchain.
Puncturable signatures provide a satisfying solution to construct practical proof-of-stake blockchain resilient to LRSL attack, despite of
the fact that existent constructions are not efficient enough for practical deployments.
In this paper, we provide an in-depth study of puncturable signatures and explore its applications in the proof-of-stake blockchain. We
formalize a security model that allows the adversary for adaptive signing and puncturing queries, and show a construction with efficient
puncturing operations based on the Bloom filter data structure and strong Diffie-Hellman assumption. The puncturing functionality we
desire is for a particular part of message, like prefix, instead of the whole message. Furthermore, we use puncturable signatures to
construct practical proof-of-stake blockchain protocols that are resilient to LRSL attack, while previously the forward-secure signature is
used to immunize this attack. We implement our scheme and provide experimental results showing that in comparison with the
forward-secure signature, our construction performs substantially better on signature size, signing and verification efficiency,
significantly on key update efficiency.
Index Terms—Puncturable signature, Bloom filter, Proof-of-Stake, Blockchain.
✦
1 INTRODUCTION
Proof-of-stake (PoS) protocols have been envisioned as a
more ecological alternative of the proof-of-work (PoW)
mechanism to maintain consensus, since PoS leverages the
virtual resources (e.g., the stake of a node) rather than con-
suming vast amounts of energy to solve the computational
puzzles in PoW. In a proof-of-stake blockchain protocol,
roughly speaking, participants randomly elect one party
to produce the next block by running a “leader election”
process with probability proportional to their current stake
held on blockchain.
In spite of high efficiency, proof-of-stake blockchains
only account for a tiny percentage of existing digital cur-
rencies market, mainly due to the fact that most existing
proof-of-stake protocols suffer from the well-known long-
range attacks [1] [2] [3](stemming from its weak subjectivity
and costless simulation) which degrades security in the
blockchain. A oft-cited long-range attack is caused by secret
key leakage (abbreviated as LRSL attack in this paper).
Specifically, an adversary can attempt to bribe/corrupt the
secret keys corresponding to accounts with a substantial
stake at some past moment (however, currently low-stake
or even no stake), and then construct a fork and alter the
history from the point in the past with the majority stake.
Moreover, the attack can be sustained due to the fact that the
adversary can continue to hold majority stake (e.g., by the
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reward fees of generating or issuing blocks). Note that the
accounts with low-stake are highly vulnerable to the secret
key leakage since they might not be well protected com-
pared with other active accounts, which further aggravates
this attack.
Puncturable signature (PS), introduced by Bellare et
al. [4], provides a satisfying solution to construct practical
proof-of-stake blockchain protocols resilient to LRSL attack.
Generally speaking, a puncturable signature scheme pro-
vides a Puncture functionality that, given a secret signing
key and a particular message m, generates an updated
secret key which is able to sign all messages except for the
punctured message m. In this paper, we further generalize
the definition of the puncturable signature, particularly, the
strings associated with the punctured signing key can be
any part of signed messages (e.g. its prefix). In proof-of-
stake protocols, the leader U (elected for issuing block) signs
the block Bi with the puncturable signature by the secret
key skU at some time slot sli, where sli is the part of block
Bi, and then U performs puncturing operation on message
sli which results in an updated sk
′
U . More specifically, if
no empty block is allowed, the punctured message can be
H(Bi−1) instead of sli, where H(Bi−1) is the part of block
Bi and Bi−1 is the previous block of Bi. The security of
puncturable signature guarantees that anyone cannot sign
another data block B′i with the same sli (or H(Bi−1))
even though sk′U is exposed, and thus LRSL attack can be
avoided.
A natural way to remedy LRSL attack in proof-of-stake
blockchain protocols is to use the forward secure signa-
ture [5], which guarantees that the previously issued sig-
natures remain valid even if the current secret signing key
is compromised. However, the computation performance
2of forward secure signature depends on either the time
periods set in advance or the time periods elapsed so far
logarithmically (even linearly), which brings undesirable
consumption and becomes a fatal issue for blockchain ap-
plications. Moreover, most signers have no chance to do
any signing within one period but they have to update
the signing key as long as the current period ends, which
makes the update operation a vain effort in the proof-of-
stake blockchain. In fact, the forward secure signature can
be treated as one special kind of the puncturable signature
where the punctured message is the earlier period of time.
Puncturable signatures can also be used in many other
scenarios such as asynchronous transaction data signing
services. Transaction data signing is a process which guar-
antees the integrity and authenticity of the sensitive trans-
action data, such as payment instruction or transaction
information of buying a real estate offering. In many cases,
using ordinary digital signatures is not enough for these
applications, as they often fail to ensure the integrity of past
messages in the case when a user’s key is compromised.
This is particularly challenging in the non-interactive and
asynchronous message system, where users may not be
online simultaneously and messages may be delayed for
substantial periods due to delivery failures and connectivity
issues. Similar problem also exists in the theoretical part.
For instance, in non-interactive multiparty computation (NI-
MPC) [6], where a group of completely asynchronous par-
ties can evaluate a function (e.g. for the purpose of voting)
over their joint inputs by sending a signed message to an
evaluator who computes the output. The adversary would
control the final output if he can corrupt some parties within
a period of time. In these examples, the transaction session
ID can be used as a prefix, and after the honest user signs
the transaction data (or message), the prefix is punctured so
that no other signature exists for messages agreeing on the
same prefix. Therefore, the integrity of transaction data (or
message) is ensured by puncturable signatures.
1.1 Our Contributions
In this work, we provide an in-depth study of the punc-
turable signature and its applications in the proof-of-stake
blockchain protocols. Our overall goal is to design a punc-
turable signature that allows for fine-grained revocation of
signing capability with minimum computation cost, and
make it a suitable building block to construct secure and
practical proof-of-stake blockchain protocol. More specifi-
cally, our technical contributions are threefold.
Puncturable signature and its construction. We introduce
the notion of puncturable signature with extended punctur-
ing functionality where the secret key can be updated by
puncturing any particular part of message (for simplicity,
we use the prefix of message in this paper) instead of
puncturing the whole message. In the security model we
propose, in addition to making adaptive signing and punc-
turing queries, adversary also has (one-time) oracle access
to a featured Corruption oracle, by which the adversary
can obtain the current secret key if the challenging string
is in the puncturing set P . Then we show a construction
of puncturable signature based on the probabilistic Bloom
filter data structure [7] is secure under our security model.
Our PS construction is inspired by an elegant work [8],
where the authors show how to construct puncturable en-
cryption based on Bloom filter. However, different from the
expanded (k times) ciphertext size of underlying encryption
scheme in [8], in our construction, the signature size is
almost equal to that of the underlying signature scheme.
In comparison with two prior puncturable signature
schemes [4] [6], our construction achieves significant effi-
ciency improvement in both signing and puncturing oper-
ations. More specifically, the construction in [4] relies on
indistinguishability obfuscation, which incurs prohibitive
computational burden in practice, while the other one [6]
needs to update public key for every puncturing, which
has some theoretical merits but hard to implement in real
world deployment. On the contrary, in our construction,
a puncturing operation only involves a small number of
efficient computations (i.e., hashing), plus the deletion of
certain parts of the secret key, which outperforms previous
schemes by orders of magnitude. Indeed, the puncturable
signature is not a simple inverse operation of the punc-
turable encryption, which is also the reason for no effi-
cient puncturable signature scheme even though efficient
puncturable encryption constructions have been proposed
for a long time. The crucial difficulty in designing the
puncturable signature scheme is how to bind the private
key with punctured messages such that the updated private
key cannot sign for punctured messages.
Applications in Proof-of-stake blockchain protocols. We use
the puncturable signature to construct practical proof-of-
stake blockchain protocols that are resilient to LRSL attack.
Ouroboros Paros [9], a proof-of-stake blockchain protocol,
has a real-world implementation in Cardano platform. We
present an ideal functionality FPS of the puncturable signa-
ture scheme, and replace FKES of the forward secure signa-
ture scheme in Ouroboros Paros [9] protocol with FPS. Then
we show that the properties (common prefix, chain quality
and chain growth) of Ouroboros Paros protocol remain true
in the replaced setting. Finally, we prove our puncturable
signature scheme can securely realize FPS in the universal
composability (UC) security framework. Without loss of
generality, we also discuss how to apply our construction
to other proof-of-stake blockchain protocols to resist LRSL
attack.
Efficiency comparison with forward secure signatures. As
mentioned above, despite that forward secure signatures
can be used to resist LRSL attack, most of the existing
schemes have poor performance on key update as well as
other operations, often depending on the time period num-
ber linearly, which is unsuitable for blockchain application.
We conduct experiments evaluating the overhead of de-
ploying our puncturable signature construction and existing
forward security signature schemes [10] [11] at both 128-bit
and 192-bit security levels. Figure 1 illustrates the efficiency
comparison and the results show that our scheme performs
substantially better on signature size, signing and verifica-
tion efficiency, significantly on key update efficiency, which
reduces both communication and computation complexity.
In fact, we can replace the ordinary signature with our
puncturable signature construction in any other proof-of-
stake protocols such as Ouroboros [12] and SnowWhite [13]
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Figure 1: Efficiency Comparison
protocols. Due to the fact that our construction can retain
the efficiency of the underlying scheme on signing and ver-
ifying, with additional k hash computations, the improved
protocols can provide resilience to LRSL attack at almost no
additional computing cost.
1.2 Related Work
Puncturable signature. A puncturable signature scheme al-
lows to update its signing key sk for an arbitrary messagem
such that the resulting punctured signing key can produce
signatures for all messages except for m. It is introduced by
Bellare et al. [4] as a tool to provide several negative results
on differing-inputs obfuscation. However, their construc-
tion is based on indistinguishability obfuscation [14] and
one-way function, thus, does not yield practical schemes.
Moreover, it requires that the punctured signing key is
associated with the full signed message. In contrast our
construction is based on the τ -SDH assumption, and the
string associated with the punctured signing key can be any
particular part of the message to be signed (e.g. the prefix of
the message), which is more flexible and applicable. Halevi
et al. [6] also propose a puncturable signature scheme which
is puncturable at any prefix of the signed message. How-
ever, their puncturable operation needs to update public
keys repeatedly. In practice, it is inefficient to verify the
updated public keys continuously and it is also difficult to
let each user in the system maintain other users’ public keys
updated.
Delegation related signature. Policy-based signature, intro-
duced by Bellare et al. [15], allows a signer to only sign a
message satisfying some policy specified by an authority.
Another related primitive, called functional signature, is
introduced in the work [16]. In functional signature, only
the master signing key can be used to sign any message,
while the authority provides the secondary signing keys for
functions f that allow the signing of any message in the
range of f . Delegatable functional signature is introduced
in the work [17] and supports the delegation of signing
rights with a policy to the designated third party. Append-
only signatures (AOS) [18] is also a related primitive, in
particular, given an AOS signature on a messagem, one can
only compute an AOS signature on any messagem′ withm
as the prefix. Different from above primitives, puncturable
signature provides a puncture functionality that may repeat-
edly update the secret key to revoke the signing capability for
selected messages in a dynamic manning.
Forward secure signature. A forward secure signature
scheme guarantees the adversary with the compromised
secret key cannot forge signatures relative to previous time
periods. It is proposed by Anderson [19] and then formal-
ized by Bellare et al. [5]. Prior forward secure signatures
are constructed by either using arbitrary signature schemes
in a black-box manner [11] [20] or modifying the existing
signature schemes [5] [10] [21]. All these forward secure
schemes except for [11], the number of time periods T
(arbitrarily large) must be set in advance, such that the
performance depends on T logarithmically or even linearly.
Nevertheless, the performance in [11] still depends on the
time periods elapsed so far.
Proof-of-stake blockchain protocols. Proof-of-stake protocols
were first initiated in online forums and subsequently a
number of proof-of-stake protocols were proposed and im-
plemented by the academic community. In order to provide
forward security (and also achieve resilience against LRSL
attack and other long-range attacks), Ouroboros Paros [9]
and Ouroboros Genesis [22] formalize and realize in the uni-
versal composition setting a forward secure digital signature
scheme, Algorand [23] considers it as one of future work
and implements ephemeral key pairs in its updated full
version [24], whereas Snow White [13] and Ouroboros [12]
adopt a weak adaptive corruption model and cannot avoid
LRSL attack. In addition, several countermeasures have
been proposed, such as the trusted execution environ-
ments [1], checkpointing mechanism [25], and punishment
mechanism revealing the real identity [1], revealing the
signing key [26] or slashing the stake [27] of the malicious
stakeholder.
2 PRELIMINARIES
Notation. Let λ denote the security parameter, ⌊x⌋ denote the
greatest integer less than or equal to x, [n] denote the set of
the first n positive integers, and PPT denote probabilistic
polynomial time. For an array T ∈ {0, 1}n, we let T [i]
denote the i-th bit of the array, if i ≤ n.
We say a function negl(·) : N→ (0, 1) is negligible, if for
every constant c ∈ N, negl(n) < n−c for sufficiently large n.
2.1 Bloom Filter
A Bloom filter [7] is a probabilistic data structure designed
to solve the approximate set membership problem. Specifi-
cally, it can be used to test whether an element is a member
4of the elements set S from a large universe U rapidly and
space-efficiently, where the false-positive error is allowed.
Put simply, for any s ∈ S the Bloom filter always outputs 1
(“yes”), and for any s /∈ S it outputs 1 only with some small
probability.
Definition 1 (Bloom Filter [8]). A Bloom filter BF for set U
consists of a tuple of PPT algorithms (Gen,Update,Check).
• Gen(ℓ, k): On input two integers ℓ, k ∈ N, the algo-
rithm first samples k universal hash functionsH1, . . . , Hk
which generate a uniform distribution over the range
{1, ..., l}, then initializes the ℓ-bit array T = 0ℓ and sets
H = {Hi}i∈[k], and finally returns (H,T ).
• Update(H,T, u): To add an element u ∈ U to S, the
algorithm updates T [Hi(u)] = 1 for all i ∈ [k], leaves
other bits of T unchanged, and returns T .
• Check(H,T, u): To check whether an element u is in S,
the algorithm returns 1 (“yes”) if ∧i∈[k]T [Hi(u)] = 1,
otherwise returns 0 (“no”).
Properties of Bloom filter. The main properties of Bloom filter
used in this paper can be summarized as follows:
Correctness: A Bloom filter always outputs 1 for elements
that have already been added to the set S. More precisely,
if s ∈ U has been added to S and the array T has
been updated by running Update(H,T, s), then we have
Pr[Check(H,T, s) = 1] = 1.
False-positive errors: A Bloom filter may yield a false-
positive error, where an element s∗ is erroneously judged
to be in S by the Check algorithm even though s∗ has
not yet been added to the set S. More precisely, the error
probability is bounded by Pr[Check(H,T, s∗) = 1] ≈
(1− ekn/ℓ)k for any s∗ /∈ S.
Space advantages: The size of representation T is a con-
stant number (i.e., l bits) independent of the size of S.
However, as the size of S increases, false-positive proba-
bility of Bloom filter would increase.
Discussion on the choice of parameters. In bloom filter, assum-
ing the optimal number of hash function k to achieve the
smallest false-positive probability pr, we obtain a size of the
bloom filter given by ℓ = −n ln pr(ln 2)2 , and the optimal k is given
by k = ⌈ ℓn ln 2⌉. For example, when pr = 10
−3 and n = 220,
we have ℓ ≈ 2 MB and k = 10.
2.2 Bilinear Groups and τ -SDH Assumption
We say that G is a bilinear group generator if given
the security parameter λ, it outputs a tuple params =
(p, e, ψ,G1,G2,GT , P1, P2), where G1, G2 and GT are three
groups having prime order p, Pi is the generator of Gi for
i ∈ {1, 2}, and e : G1 × G2 → GT is a non-degenerate map
satisfying:
• Bilinearity: For any (P,Q) ∈ G1 × G2 and a, b ∈ Z∗p,
e(aP, bQ) = e(P,Q)ab holds.
• Non-degeneracy: e(P,Q) = 1 for any Q ∈ G2 iff P = O.
• Computability: There exists an efficient algorithm to com-
pute e(P,Q) for any (P,Q) ∈ G1 × G2.
• There exists an publicly and efficiently computable iso-
morphism ψ : G2 → G1 such that ψ(P2) = P1.
The security of our scheme is based on τ -strong Diffie-
Hellman (τ -SDH) assumption, which was previously for-
malized in [28] and [29].
Definition 2 (τ -Strong Diffie-Hellman Assumption
(τ -SDH)). Let params = (p, e, ψ,G1,G2,GT , P1, P2) ←
G(1λ) and (P1, P2, αP2, α2P2, ..., ατP2) be a τ + 2
tuple for α ∈ Z∗p. We say τ -SDH assumption
holds if for any PPT adversary A, Pr[(h, 1h+αP1) ←
A(P1, P2, αP2, α2P2, ..., ατP2)] ≤ negl(λ) with h ∈ Z∗p.
3 PUNCTURABLE SIGNATURES
In this section, we formalize the syntax and security def-
inition of puncturable signature, and then we propose a
puncturable signature scheme and prove its security under
the τ -SDH assumption.
3.1 Syntax and Security Definition
Let the message space be M. A puncturable signature
scheme Σ consists of a tuple of PPT algorithms Σ =
(Setup,Puncture, Sign,Verify) with descriptions as follows:
• Setup(1λ, ℓ, k): On input the security parameter λ, param-
eters ℓ and k for the Bloom filter, the setup algorithm
outputs the public key vk as well as the secret key sk.
• Puncture(sk, str): On input the secret key sk and a string
str ∈ M, the puncturing algorithm outputs the updated
secret key sk′ which is also called the punctured secret
key. We also say that str has been punctured.
• Sign(sk,m): On input the secret key sk and a message m,
it outputs a signature σ.
• Verify(vk,m, σ): On input the public key vk, a signature σ
and message m, the verification algorithm outputs 1 if σ
is a valid signature for m. Otherwise, it outputs 0.
Correctness of puncturable signatures. Intuitively, the cor-
rectness requires that (1) signing is always successful with
the initial, non-punctured secret key, (2) signing fails when
attempting to sign a message with a prefix that has been
punctured, and (3) the probability that signing fails is
bounded by some non-negligible function, if the prefix of
the message to be signed has not been punctured.
Definition 3 (Correctness). For any message m with prefix
m′, any (skinit, vk) ← Setup(1λ), and any sequence of
invocations of sk← Puncture(sk, .), we have
1) Verify(vk,m, Sign(skinit,m)) = 1, where skinit is the ini-
tial, non-punctured secret key.
2) If m′ has been punctured, then
Verify(vk,m, Sign(sk′,m)) = 0, where sk′ ←
Puncture(sk,m′).
3) Otherwise, it holds that Pr[Verify(vk,m, Sign(sk,m)) 6=
1] ≤ µ(ℓ, k), where µ(·) is a (possibly non-negligible)
bound.
Remark 1. We notice that the puncturing functionality defined
above is for message-prefix, whose length can be determined
in specific implementation (e.g., the slot parameter in proof-
of-stake blockchain). In specific applications, the message m
to be signed can be split into n (n ≥ 1) parts denoted by
m = m1||...||mi||...||mn, where different parts may have differ-
ent lengths and different semantics, for example, m1 denotes the
5time stamp and the remaining denotes the message specifics. We
can extend the puncturing functionality by puncturing strings at
arbitrarily pre-defined position (even the whole message), e.g. i-th
part, which means the signing algorithm fails for message m =
m1‖...‖mi‖...‖mn if mi has been punctured. For simplicity, we
still use prefix-puncturing in this paper, but both the definitions
and our constructions can be easily extended to support the
general puncturing functionality.
Security Definition. Intuitively, the security definition of
puncturable signature scheme requires that the adversary
cannot forge signatures on messages having been punctured
even though the punctured secret key is compromised. For-
mally, for any PPT adversary A, we consider the experiment
Expt
ps
A(1
λ) between A and the challenger C:
1) Setup: C computes (vk, sk) ← Setup(1λ) and sends vk to
the adversary A. C initializes two empty sets Qsig = ∅
and P = ∅.
2) Query Phase: Proceeding adaptively, the adversary A
can submit the following two kinds of queries:
• Signature query: On input a message m from the
adversaryA, C computes σ ← Sign(sk,m) and updates
Qsig = Qsig ∪ {m}. Then C sends back σ.
• Puncture query: On input a string str, C updates sk by
running Puncture(sk, str), and updates P=P ∪ {str}.
3) Challenge Phase: A sends the challenging string m′ to
C, and A can still submit signature and puncture queries
as described in the Query phase.
4) Corruption query: The challenger returns sk if m′ ∈ P
and ⊥ otherwise.
5) Forgery: A outputs a forgery pair (m,σ).
We say that adversary Awins the experiment ExptpsA(1
λ) if
m′ is the prefix of m andm /∈ Qsig ∧ Verify(vk,m, σ) = 1.
Definition 4 (Unforgeability with adaptive puncturing). We
say the puncturable signature scheme ps is unforgeable with
adaptive puncturing, if for any PPT adversary A, the prob-
ability of winning experiment ExptpsA(1
λ) is negl(λ), where
the probability is over the randomness of the challenger and
adversary.
3.2 Our Construction
We present a puncturable signature construction based on
the Chinese IBS, an identity-based signature scheme stan-
dardized in ISO/IEC 14888-3 [30].
The key idea of our construction is to derive secret keys
for all Bloom filter bits i ∈ [l] using IBS schemes, and
then bind the prefix string m′ with k positions where the
secret keys are used to sign messages with prefix m′. In
addition, puncturing at m′ implies the deletion of keys in
the corresponding positions.
Let (p, e, ψ,G1,G2,GT , P1, P2) ← G(1λ), and BF =
(BF.Gen, BF.Update,BF.Check) be a Bloom filter. Choose
a random generator P2 ∈ G2, and set P1 = ψ(P2) ∈ G1.
Let h1 : N → Z∗p and h2 : {0, 1}
∗ × GT → Z∗p be
cryptographic hash functions, which we model as random
oracles in the security proof. The public parameters are
params := (p, e, ψ,G1,G2,GT , P1, P2, h1, h2) and all the
algorithms described below implicitly take params as in-
put. The construction of the puncturable signature scheme
ps = (Setup,Puncture, Sign,Verify) is the following:
• Setup(1λ, ℓ, k): This algorithm first generates a Bloom
filter instance by running ({Hj}j∈[k], T ) ← BF.Gen(ℓ, k).
Then it chooses s
$
← Z∗p and outputs
sk = (T, {ski}i∈[ℓ]), vk = (Ppub, g, {Hj}j∈[k]),
where ski =
s
s+h1(i)
P1, Ppub = sP2, and g = e(P1, Ppub).
• Puncture(sk, str): Given a secret key sk = (T, {ski}i∈[ℓ])
where ski =
s
s+h1(i)
P1 or ⊥, this algorithm first computes
T ′ = BF.Update ({Hj}j∈[k], T , str). Then, for each i ∈ [ℓ]
define
sk′i =
{
ski, if T
′[i] = 0
⊥, otherwise
where T ′[i] denotes the i-th bit of T ′. Finally, the algo-
rithm returns sk′ = (T ′, {sk′i}i∈[ℓ]).
• Sign(sk,m): Given a secret key sk = (T, {ski}i∈[ℓ]) and a
message m with the prefix m′, the algorithm first checks
whether BF.Check ({Hj}j∈[k], T , m
′) = 1 and outputs
⊥ in this case. Otherwise, note that BF.Check({Hj}j∈[k],
T , m′) = 0 means there exists at least one index ij ∈
{i1, · · · , ik} such that skij 6= ⊥, where ij = Hj(m
′)
for j ∈ [k]. Then it picks a random index ij∗ such that
skij∗ =
s
s+h1(ij∗ )
P1. Choose x
$
← Z∗p and compute r = g
x,
then set
h = h2(m, r), S = (x− h)skij∗ .
The output signature on m is σ = (h, S, ij∗).
• Verify(vk,m, σ): Given a public key vk =
(Ppub, g, {Hj}j∈[k]), a message m with the prefix
m′, and a signature σ = (h, S, ij∗), the algorithm checks
whether
ij∗ ∈ Sm′ ∧ h = h2
(
m, e(S, h1(ij∗)P2 + Ppub)g
h
)
,
where Sm′ = {Hj(m′) : j ∈ [k]}. If it holds, the algorithm
outputs 1, and 0 otherwise.
Lemma 3.1. Our basic construction described above satisfies
correctness (c.f. Definition 3).
Proof. If the secret key is initial and non-punctured, we have
e(S, h1(ij∗)P2 + Ppub)g
h
= e((x− h).
s
h1(ij∗) + s
P1, (h1(ij∗) + s)P2).e(P1, P2)
hs
= e(P1, P2)
xs−hse(P1, P2)
hs = gx = r
and then h = h2
(
m, r) = h2(m, e(S, h1(ij∗)P2 + Ppub)g
h
)
.
Therefore, the first requirement of Definition 3 holds. If m′
is punctured, by the correctness of Bloom filter, we have
BF.Check(H,T,m′) = 1, which means all the secret keys
used to sign messages with m′ as the prefix have been
deleted. Therefore, the signing of the message m with the
prefix m′ fails and the second requirement of Definition 3
holds. If m′ is not punctured, the correctness error of our
construction occurs only when BF.Check(H,T,m′) = 1,
which is essentially identical to the false-positive probability
of the Bloom filter, and the third requirement of Definition 3
holds.
Remark 2. In this section, we assume that the false-positive
probability from Bloom filter is acceptable, which means the
number of puncturings supported by our construction is below
6a pre-set parameter, depending on the application scenarios and
the upper bound n of the Bloom filter. In the security proof below,
we assume that the number of puncturing queries is also bounded
by the pre-set parameter.
Theorem 1. Assuming that an algorithm A wins in the
Expt
ps
A(1
λ) experiment (c.f. Definition 4) to our construc-
tion ps, with the advantage ǫ0 ≥ 10k(qS + 1)(qS +
qh2)/
(
p(1 − (1 − 1/l)k)
)
within running time t0, τ -SDH
assumption can be broken for τ = qh1 within running time
t2 ≤ 120686qh2t0/(ǫ0(1 − τ/p)), where qh1 , qh2 and qS are
the maximum query times of the hash function h1, h2 and
signing, respectively.
Proof. In order to prove the security of our scheme, we con-
sider a particular adversary B with a fixed position against
our signature scheme in a variant of the above experiment
Expt
ps
A(1
λ), denoted by ExptfpsA (1
λ). Specifically, in the
Setup, the challenger returns system parameters together
with a fixed position i∗ ∈ [l]; the following Query Phase
remains unchanged and the Challenge Phase can be omit-
ted; in the Corruption query, the challenger only returns the
current secret key by excluding the key at position i∗. We
say B wins the experiment ExptfpsA (1
λ), if B outputs the
messagem together with a valid signature (h, S, i∗) on m.
We sketch the proof in two steps as in [31] [32]. First,
we prove there exists an algorithm B that wins in the
Expt
fps
A (1
λ) experiment with a non-negligible advantage,
if the adversary A has a non-negligible advantage against
our signature scheme ps in the ExptpsA(1
λ) experiment (c.f.
Lemma 3.2). Then, assuming the existence of B, we can
construct an algorithm C that breaks the τ -SDH assumption
(c.f. Lemma 3.3).
Lemma 3.2. Assuming that an algorithm A wins in the
Expt
ps
A(1
λ) experiment (c.f. Definition 4) to our construc-
tion ps, with a probability ǫ0 within running time t0, there
exists an algorithm B that wins in the ExptfpsA (1
λ) exper-
iment as described above to ps which has a probability
ǫ1 ≥ ǫ0(1− (1− 1/l)k)/k within running time t1 ≤ t0.
Proof. Suppose there exists such an adversary A, and we
construct a simulator B that simulates an attack environ-
ment and uses A’s forgery to win in its own ExptfpsA (1
λ)
experiment. The simulator B can be described as follows:
• Invocation. B is invoked on a given position i∗ ∈ [l].
• Queries. B answers adaptive queries from A as follows:
– B makes the Setup query and forwards all the returned
parameters to A for A’s Setup query.
– BeforeA outputs the challenging string, B just forwards
the queries of A, including Sign, Puncture, h1 and h2,
to its experiment and returns the result to A.
– When A outputs the challenging string denoted by
m′ after the series of queries, B checks whether i∗ ∈
{Hj(m′) : j ∈ [k]} and aborts if this does not hold.
Otherwise, B provides the simulation for A as follows.
For the queries h1, h2, Puncture and Sign, B just passes
them to its challenger and returns the result as before.
While for Corruption query, B firstly checks whether
m′ ∈ P and returns ∅ if this does not hold. Otherwise, B
makes Corruption query in its experiment, and returns
the response sk to A.
Eventually, A outputs a valid signature (m,σ =
(h, S, j∗)), where m′ is the prefix of m. If j∗ = i∗, then
B sets (m,σ) as its own output and apparently B also wins
in its ExptfpsA (1
λ) experiment.
In the simulation described above, there are two events
that cause B to abort: (1) i∗ /∈ {Hj(m′) : j ∈ [k]} for the
challenging string m′; (2) i∗ 6= j∗ for the forged signature
σ = (h, S, j∗).
Recall that the k hash functions in Bloom filter are sam-
pled universally and independently, and thus each position
in the array is selected with an equal probability. Besides,
i∗ is invisible and looks random to A, then the selection
of m′ is independent of i∗. Therefore the probability that
i∗ /∈ {Hj(m′) : j ∈ [k]} is (1 − 1/ℓ)k. Similarly, the second
event i∗ 6= j∗ happens with probability 1 − 1/k. Combing
these, with probability ǫ1 ≥ ǫ0(1−(1−1/l)
k)/k,B completes
the whole simulation without aborting and wins in the
Expt
fps
A (1
λ) experiment. 
Lemma 3.3. Assuming that an algorithm B wins in the
Expt
fps
A (1
λ) experiment to our construction ps, with an
advantage ǫ1 ≥ 10(qS + 1)(qS + qh2)/p within running
time t1, there exists an algorithm C that breaks the τ -
SDH assumption for τ = qh1 within running time t2 ≤
120686qh2t1/(ǫ1(1 − τ/p)), where qh1 , qh2 and qS are the
maximum query times of the hash function h1, h2 and
signing, respectively.
Proof. Suppose there exists such an adversary B, and we
construct a simulator C that simulates an attack environment
and uses B’s forgery to break the τ -SDH assumption. The
simulator C can be described as follows:
• Invocation. Given a random instance (P1, P2, αP2,
α2P2,...,α
τP2) of the τ -SDH assumption as input, C aims
to find a pair (h, 1h+αP1) for some h ∈ Z
∗
p .
• Setup. C randomly samples τ − 1 elements w1,w2,...,wτ−1
R
←− Z∗p , where wi (i ∈ [τ − 1]) will be used as the
responses to B’s h1 queries. C expands the polynomial
f(y) =
∏τ−1
i=1 (y + wi) to obtain the the coefficients
c0, c1, ..., cτ−1 ∈ Z∗p such that f(y) =
∑τ−1
i=0 ciy
i .
Then C sets Pˆ2 =
∑τ−1
i=0 ciα
iP2 = f(α)P2 ∈ G2
and Pˆ1 = ψ(Pˆ2) ∈ G1 to be new generators of G2
and G1, respectively. The master public key is set to
Pˆpub =
∑τ
i=1 ci−1(α
iP2) such that Pˆpub = αPˆ2. Note that
the master secret key is the unknown α.
To provide the secret keys corresponding to positions
having been queried to h1, C expands fi(y) = f(y)/(y +
wi) =
∑τ−2
i=0 diy
i and
τ−2∑
i=0
diψ(α
i+1P2) = αfi(α)P1 =
αf(α)P1
α+ wi
=
α
α+ wi
Pˆ1 (1)
Therefore, the τ − 1 pairs (wi,
α
α+wi
Pˆ1) for i ∈ [τ − 1] can
be computed using the left member of equation (1).
Then C provides the parameters (p, e, ψ, G1, G2, GT , Pˆ1,
Pˆ2, h1, h2) to B. In addition, C also generates a Bloom filter
as ({Hj}j∈[k], T ) ← BF.Gen(ℓ, k), and outputs the public
key vk = (Pˆpub, g, {Hj}j∈[k]) and challenging position i
∗
toB, where g = e(Pˆ1, Pˆpub). Next, C is ready to answerB’s
queries during the simulation. For simplicity, we assume
as in [32] that for any i ∈ [l], B queries h1(i) at most
7once and any query involving i is proceeded by the RO
query h1(i), which means that B has to query h1(i) before
he can obtain the signature (h, S, i) from Signature query
and the secret key ski from Corruption query by using a
simple wrapper of B.
• Hash function queries. C initializes a counter t to 1.
– h1 : [l] → Z∗p: On input i ∈ [l], C returns a random
w = w∗
R
←− Z∗p if i = i
∗. Otherwise, C returns w = wt
and sets t = t+ 1. In both cases, C stores (i, w) in a list
L1.
– h2 : {0, 1}∗ × GT → Z∗p : On input (m, r), C outputs
h if (m, r, h) is in the list L2 (initialized to be empty).
Otherwise, it outputs a random element h and stores
(m, r, h) in L2.
Note that, according to the query of h1 and the com-
putation in the setup phase, C knows the secret key
ski =
α
α+wi
Pˆ1 for i 6= i
∗.
• Query Phase. C answers adaptive signing and puncturing
queries from B as follows:
– Signature query: On input a message m with pre-
fix m′, C first checks BF.Check({Hj}j∈[k], T,m
′) = 1
and outputs ⊥ in this case. Otherwise, there exists at
least one index ij ∈ {i1, . . . , ik} such that skij 6= ⊥,
where ij = Hj(m
′), for j ∈ [k]. C picks a random
j ∈ {i1, . . . , ik}, S
R
←− G and h
R
←− Z∗p, computes
and sets r = e(S, h1(j)Pˆ2 + Pˆpub).e(Pˆ1, Pˆpub)
h, and
backpatches to define h2(m, r) = h. Finally, C stores
(m, r, h) in L2, and returns the signature σ = (h, S, j)
(C aborts in the unlikely collision event that h2(m, r)
is already defined by other query results of Sign or
h2, the probability of which is negligible since r is
random [33]).
– Puncture query: On input a string str, C first updates
T ′ = BF.Update({Hj}j∈[k], T, str). Then for each i ∈
[ℓ], update
sk′i =
{
ski, if T
′[i] = 0
⊥, otherwise
The updated signing key is sk′ = (T ′, {sk′i}i∈[ℓ]).
• Corruption query: For Corruption query, C recovers the
matching pair (i, w) from L1 and returns the previously
computed αα+w Pˆ1.
• Forgery. If adversary B forges a valid tuple (m, r, h, S, i∗)
in a time t1 with probability ǫ1 ≥ 10(qS + 1)(qS +
qh2)/p, where the message m has prefix m
′, accord-
ing to the forking lemma [33], C can replay adversary
B with different choices of random elements for hash
function h2 and obtain two valid tuples (m, r, h
′, S1, i
∗)
and (m, r, h′′, S2, i
∗), with h′ 6=h′′ in expected time
t2≤120686qh2t1/ǫ1.
Now we can apply the standard argument for outputs
of the forking lemma as follows: C recovers the pair (i∗, w∗)
from L1, and note that w
∗ 6= w1, ..., wτ−1 with probability
at least 1− τ/p. Since both forgeries are valid signatures, we
can obtain the following relations:
e(S1, Qi∗).e(Pˆ1, Pˆpub)
h′ = e(S2, Qi∗).e(Pˆ1, Pˆpub)
h′′ ,
where Qi∗ = h1(i
∗)Pˆ2 + Pˆpub = (w
∗ + α)Pˆ2. Then we have
e((h′′ − h′)−1 · (S1 − S2), Qi∗) = e(Pˆ1, Pˆpub),
and hence T ∗ = (Pˆ1 − (h′′ − h′)−1.(S1 − S2))/w∗ =
(Pˆ1 −
α
w∗+α Pˆ1)/w
∗ = 1w∗+α Pˆ1 =
f(α)
w∗+αP1. From T
∗, C can
proceed as in [28] to extract σ∗ = 1w∗+αP1: C first writes the
polynomial f as f(y) = γ(y)(y+w∗)+γ−1 by using the long
division method, where γ(y) =
∑τ−2
i=0 γiy
i and γ−1 ∈ Z∗p,
and eventually computes
σ∗ =
1
γ−1
[
T ∗ −
τ−2∑
i=0
γiψ(α
iP2)
]
=
1
w∗ + α
P1
and returns (w∗, σ∗) as the solution to the τ -SDH instance.

The combination of the above lemmas yields Theorem 1. 
4 PUNCTURABLE SIGNATURE IN PROOF-OF-
STAKE BLOCKCHAIN
Before describing the application of the puncturable signa-
ture scheme in proof-of-stake blockchain, we recall some
basic definitions [9] [12] of proof-of-stake blockchain and
secure properties [34] [35] of blockchain. We assume that
there are n stakeholders U1, . . . , Un, and each stakeholder
Ui possesses si stake and a public/secret key pair (vki, ski).
Without loss of generality, we assume that all system users
know the public keys vk1, . . . , vkn. The protocol execution
is divided in time units (also called slots).
Definition 5 (Epoch, Block, State, Genesis Block,
Blockchain [9]). An epoch is a collection of R sequential
slots S = {sl1, ..., slR}, where R is a system parameter
and the stake distribution for selecting slot leaders remains
unchanged during one epoch.
A block generated at the slot slj (j ∈ [R]) is a tuple
of the form Bj = (slj , stj , dj , σj)
1, where stj ∈ {0, 1}
λ
denotes the state of the previous block Bj−1 such that
stj = H(Bj−1), dj ∈ {0, 1}∗ denotes the transaction data,
and σj denotes a signature on (slj , stj , dj) computed under
the signing key of the stakeholder Ui (i.e., the leader of the
slot slj who is eligible to generate the block).
The genesis block is denoted by B0 = (R0, ρ), where
R0 =
(
(vk1, s1), (vk2, s2), ..., (vkn, sn)
)
contains the corre-
sponding public keys and stakes of the stakeholders, and ρ
denotes the auxiliary information used as the seed for the
process of the slot leader election.
A blockchain C is initialised as the genesis block B0
followed by a sequence of blocks B1, · · · , Bn, where the
block Bj (j ∈ [n]) is generated in the slot slj in an ascending
order and the length of C (denoted by len(C)) is n. We call
the rightmost block Bn the head of C, denoted by head(C).
Definition 6 (Properties of Blockchain [9]). A blockchain
protocol should satisfy the following three properties.
• Common Prefix. C
⌈k
i is the prefix of Cj if Ci and Cj are the
chains maintained by two honest stakeholders at the slot
1. Recall that the puncturable signature proposed in this paper sup-
ports puncturing at any position. For ease of presentation, slot number
slj is defined as the prefix of the block, however, it maybe has different
locations in specific PoS protocols.
8sli and slj (sli < slj) respectively, where C
⌈k
i denotes the
chain after pruning the last k blocks from Ci and k ∈ N is
the common prefix parameter.
• Chain Quality. For any l consecutive blocks in the chain of
an honest stakeholder, the fraction of blocks contributed
by the adversary is at most 1 − µ. µ ∈ [0, 1] is also called
the chain quality coefficient.
• Chain Growth. For two chains Ci and Cj possessed by
two honest stakeholders at the slot sli and slj respectively,
where slj − sli ≥ s, we have len(Cj) − len(Ci) ≥ τ · s. τ
is also called the speed coefficient.
4.1 Application in Ouroboros Paros Protocol
Recall that in Ouroboros Praos protocl [9], the adversary
is allowed to adaptively corrupt stakeholders under the
honest majority of stake assumption, which is achieved
by formalizing and realizing the forward secure signatures
and the verifiable random function (VRF) under the UC
framework.
In their security analysis [9], the basic PoS protocol for
the static stake case is formalized into a functionality FSPoS
run by the stakeholders in theFINIT-hybrid model, where the
stakeholders can interact with the ideal functionalities FINIT,
FVRF, FKES and FDSIG. Specifically, the functionality FINIT
determines the genesis block B0, where ρ is set to be the
random nonce η, and the public key for the stakeholderUi is
vki = {vvrfi , v
kes
i , v
dsig
i } for the functionality FVRF, FKES and
FDSIG respectively. In addition, FVRF models a special VRF
used to select the leaders eligible to issue new blocks, FKES
models forward secure (key-evolving) signature schemes
used by the leaders to sign the new block, and FDSIG
models EUF-CMA secure signature schemes used to sign
the transactions. In addition, the block in Ouroboros Praos
includes an additional entry Bπ , which is the output of
VRF and used as the block proof and the validity check.
It is proved FSPoS can achieve common prefix, chain growth
and chain quality properties, and these properties remain
unchanged when all of the underlying functionalities are
replaced by their real world implementations (also called
real experiment). Finally, the protocol is extended to the
dynamic case allowing for changes of the stake distribution
over time. To avoid unnecessary repetitions, we omit details
of the above functionalities and proofs [9].
The puncturable signature can resist LRSL attack due to
the fact that the leader U in slot slj would update the secret
signing key sk after the block is proposed, and with the
updated signing key the adversary cannot forge a signature
at slj in the name of U and thus cannot re-write a new block
at the position slj . We now present an ideal functionality
FPS of puncturable signature scheme (described in Figure
2), replace FKES using FPS in the revised static proof-of-
stake protocol π′SPoS (described in Figure 3), prove that
π′SPoS still satisfies all properties of blockchain (i.e., common
prefix, chain quality and chain growth)2, and also show
that FPS can be realized by basic puncturable signature
construction in Section 3.2.
2. Also note that as in [9], we also assume in this paper that honest
stakeholders would perform erasures securely to achieve key update,
which is reasonable to capture protocol security against adaptive ad-
versaries as argued in [36].
In a high level, the ideal functionality FPS (Figure 2)
allows an adversary compromising the signing keys of
the signer to forge signatures only for messages with the
unpunctured prefix. Starting from the regular signature
functionality in [37], FPS is extended by packing the signing
operation with a puncture operation. For the verification
operation, FPS allows the adversary to control the response
only for the signature on the messages with the unpunc-
tured prefix.
Theorem 2. The revised proof-of-stake blockchain protocol
π′SPoS described in Figure 3 still satisfies common prefix,
chain quality and chain growth.
Proof. Given the event of violating one of common prefix,
chain quality and chain growth in an execution of π′SPoS
with access to FPS by adversary A and environment Z , we
can construct an adversary A′ so that the corresponding
event happens with the same probability in an execution of
πSPoS with access to FKES by adversary A′ and environment
Z , where πSPoS is original protocol [9]. Specifically, the
adversary A′ simulates A as follows:
• Upon receiving (KeyGen, sid, US) from FPS,A
′ runs as in
the case of FKES for key generation, sets counter kctr = 1
and P = ∅, and sends (PublicKey, sid, US, v) to FPS3 .
• Upon receiving (Sign, sid, US,m = m
′ · · · ) from FPS,
A′ ignores the request if m′ ∈ P . Otherwise, it sets
j = kctr and computes the signature σ as in the case
of FKES. Then A′ updates the corresponding secret key,
sets counter kctr = j + 1 and P = P ∪ m′, and sends
(Signature, sid, US,m, σ) to FPS.
• Upon receiving (Verify, sid,m, σ, v′) from FPS, A′ ver-
ifies the signature as in the case of FKES, and sends
(Verified, sid,m, φ) to FPS.
Note that in an execution of π′SPoS with access to FPS, m
′
in FPS equals sl (i.e, the slot parameter of the last block) (c.f.
Definition 5), while in the execution of πSPoS with access to
FKES, the input to signature algorithm is (Usign, sid,m =
sl||..., sl), which means that the update of punctured set P
is consistent with that of counter kctr. In other words, when
one signing happens onm containing some prefix sl, P adds
sl in FPS while kctr increases by 1 in FKES.
Therefore, A′ can simulate the execution for A. If the
environment Z can distinguish a real execution with A and
π′SPoS (accessing FPS) from an ideal execution that provides
the properties of common prefix, chain quality and chain
growth, then Z can also distinguish a real execution withA′
and πSPoS (accessing FKES) from an ideal execution, which
means that any winning advantage of the adversary against
common prefix, chain quality and chain growth in π′SPoS
with access to FPS immediately implies at least the same
advantage in πSPoS with access to FKES. 
Remark 3. The dynamic stake case can be extended just as in
[9]. Specifically, FINIT is replaced with a resettable leaky beacon
functionality, where the adversary is allowed to obtain the nonce
value for the next epoch and reset the nonce several times, and
other sub-functionalities remain unchanged.
3. In FKES [9], kctr denotes the current time period. Specifically, after
signing any message in the period kctr, the signer would generate a
new secret key for the next time period kctr + 1.
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FPS runs between a specific signer US and other stakeholders U1, ..., Un as follows:
Key Generation. When receiving (KeyGen, sid, US) from some US , it first checks whether there exists some sid
′ such
that sid = (US , sid
′) and aborts if not. Otherwise, it forwards (KeyGen, sid, US) to the adversary A. Upon receiving
the response (PublicKey, sid, US , vk) from A, it outputs the public key (PublicKey, sid, vk) to US , keeps the entry
(sid, US, vk), and initializes the set P = ∅.
Sign and Puncture. When receiving (PSign, sid, US,m = m
′...) from US , it first checks whether there exists a
recorded entry (sid, US , vk) for some sid and m
′ /∈ P , and aborts if not. Otherwise, it forwards (Sign, sid, US ,m)
to the adversary A. When receiving the output (Signature, sid, US,m, σ) from A, it checks whether there ex-
ists a recorded entry (m,σ, vk, 0) and aborts with an error output if not. Otherwise, it outputs the signature
(Signature, sid,m, σ) to US , keeps the entry (m,σ, vk, 1) recorded, and sets P = P ∪ {m′}.
Signature Verification. When receiving (Verify, sid,m = m′..., σ, vk′) from some party Ui (i ∈ [n]), it proceeds as
follows:
1) If vk′ = vk and there exists a recorded entry (m,σ, vk, 1) for vk, it sets l = 1. (The completeness property
is guaranteed by this condition: If the public key has been registered and the signature on the msessage m is
generated legitimately, then the verification succeeds.)
2) Else, if vk′ = vk, there is no recorded entry (m,σ′, vk′, 1) for any σ′, and the signer is uncorrupted, then set l = 0
and keep the entry (m,σ, vk′, 0) recorded. (The unforgeability property is guaranteed by this condition: If the
public key has been registered, the messagem has never been signed by the signer, and the signer is uncorrupted,
then the verification fails.)
3) Else, if there exists a recorded entry (m,σ, vk′, l′), then set l = l′. (The consistency property is guaranteed by this
condition: the answers are identical for the repeated verification requests.)
4) Else, if m′ ∈ P , then let l = 0 and keep the entry (m,σ, v, 0) recorded. Otherwise, forward (Verify, sid,m, σ, v′) to
A. Upon receiving the response (Verified, sid,m, ω) from A, set l = ω and keep the entry (m,σ, v′, ω) recorded.
(This condition ensures that the adversaryA can only forge signatures of corrupted stakeholders on messages with
the unpunctured prefix.)
Finally, it forwards the output (Verified, sid,m, l) to Ui.
Figure 2: Functionality FPS
Realizing FPS. Following the proof strategy of [37], we
show how to translate a puncturable signature scheme Σ
into a signature protocol πΣ in the present setting and
then prove that πΣ can securely realize FPS. Specifically, πΣ
protocol runs between a signer US and other stakeholders
U1, ..., Un, and proceeds based on a puncturable signature
scheme Σ=(Setup, Puncture, Sign, Verify) as follows:
1) Key Generation: When running πΣ and receiving
(KeyGen, sid, US), US first checks whether there exists
sid′ such that sid = (US , sid
′). If yes, he runs Setup(1λ)
to generate the public/secret key pair (vk, sk), keeps the
signing key (sid, US , sk) for US , sets P = ∅, and finally
outputs (PublicKey, sid, vk). Otherwise, it aborts.
2) Sign and Puncture: When receiving (PSign, sid, US ,
m = m′...) such that US owns the signing key (sid,
US , sk) for sid, US checks whether m
′ ∈ P . If not,
US runs Sign(sk,m) to obtain the signature σ, runs
Puncture(sk,m′) to update the secret key, sets P =
P ∪m′, and outputs (Signature, sid,m, σ).
3) Verify: If stakeholder Ui (i ∈ [n]) receives
(Verify, sid,m, σ, vk′) as an input, he outputs
(Verified, sid,m,Verify(vk′,m, σ)).
Theorem 3. If a puncturable signature scheme Σ =
(Setup,Puncture, Sign,Verify) satisfies the unforgeability
with adaptive puncturing as in Definition 4, then πΣ se-
curely realizes FPS.
Proof. Assume that πΣ does not realize FPS, i.e. for any
ideal-process simulator S there exists an environmentZ that
can distinguish a real setting with A and πΣ from an ideal
setting with S and FPS. Then following the proof approach
of [37], we use Z to construct a forger G that wins with
non-negligible probability in the experimentExptpsG(1
λ) for
the underlying puncturable signature scheme Σ as defined
in Definition 4, which in turn violates the unforgeability
with adaptive puncturing of Σ. Since Z can succeed for any
simulator S, it also succeeds for the following specific S,
where S runs a simulated copy of A:
1) S forwards any input from Z to A, and also forwards
any outputs from A to Z .
2) Whenever receiving (KeyGen, sid, US) from FPS, S
checks whether sid = (US , sid
′) for some sid′, and
ignores this request if not. Otherwise, S runs Setup(1λ)
to generate the public/secret key pair (vk, sk), keeps
the signing key (sid, US , sk) recorded, sets P = ∅, and
returns (PublicKey, sid, vk) to FPS.
3) Whenever receiving (PSign, sid, US ,m = m
′...) from
FPS, S checks whether there exists a recorded signing
key (sid, US , sk) and m
′ /∈ P , and ignores this request
if not. Otherwise, S runs Sign(sk,m) to obtain σ, runs
Puncture(sk,m′) to obtain the update secret keys, sets
P = P ∪ {m′}, and returns (Signature, sid,m, σ) to FPS.
4) Whenever receiving (Verify, sid,m, σ, vk′) from FPS, S
returns (Verified, sid,m,Verify(vk′,m, σ)) to FPS.
5) Whenever A corrupts a party Ui, S corrupts Ui in the
ideal execution. If Ui is the signer US , S returns the
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The PoS protocol π′SPoS is run by stakeholders Ui (i ∈ [n]) over a sequence of slots S = {sl1, · · · , slR}, and the
sub-functionalities FINIT, FVRF, FPS and FDSIG are employed. Define Ti = 2ℓVRF(1 − (1 − f)αi) as the threshold for a
stakeholder Ui, where αi is the relative stake owned by the stakeholder Ui, ℓVRF denotes the length of FVRF output,
and f denotes the active coefficient. π′SPoS performs the following steps:
Initialization. Upon receiving the request (KeyGen, sid, Ui) from the stakeholder Ui, FPS, FDSIG and FVRF return the
response (PublicKey, sid, v
ps
i ), (PublicKey, sid, v
dsig
i ) and (PublicKey, sid, v
vrf
i ), respectively.
In the case of the first round, Ui forwards (ver keys, sid, Ui, v
ps
i , v
dsig
i , v
vrf
i ) to FINIT for initial stake distribution.
In any case, Ui finally returns (Ui, v
ps
i , v
dsig
i , v
vrf
i ) to Z and then terminates the round. In the next round, Ui sends
(genblock req, sid, Ui) to FINIT and receives (genblock, sid,B0, η) as the response.
IfUi has been registered in the first round, the local chain ofUi is set as C = B0 and its initial state is set as st = H(B0).
Otherwise, the local chain C is provided by the environment and its initial state is set as st = H(head(C)).
Chain Extension. Each online stakeholder Ui (for each slot slj) proceeds as follows:
1) Ui collects the transaction data d ∈ {0, 1}
∗.
2) Ui collects all valid chains via broadcast and put them into a set C. Then for each chain C′ ∈ C and each block
B′ =(st′, d′, sl′, B′π, σj′) ∈ C
′, Ui checks whether the stakeholder creating B
′ belongs to the slot leader set for
the slot sl′ (specifically, Ui parses B
′
π as (Us, y
′, π′) for some s, and verifies that (Verified, sid, η‖sl′, y′, π′, 1) is
returned by FVRF for the request (Verify, sid, η‖sl′, y′, π′, vvrfs ) and moreover y
′ < Ts), and whether the request
(Verify, sid, (sl′, st′, d′, B′π), σj′ , v
ps
s ) to FPS is responded by (Verified, sid, (sl′, st′, d′, B′π), 1). Ui sets the new local
chain C′ as the longest chain from C ∪ C, and the state as st = H(head(C′)).
3) Upon receiving the request (EvalProve, sid, η‖slj) from Ui, FVRF returns (Evaluated, sid, y, π). Ui checks y < Ti to
judge whether it belongs to the slot leader set for the slot slj . If yes, a new block B = (slj, st, d, Bπ, σ) is produced
by Ui, where st is its current state, d ∈ {0, 1}∗ is the transaction data, Bπ = (Ui, y, π), and σ is a signature obtained
by receiving the response (Signature, sid, (slj , st, d, Bπ), σ) of FPS for the request (PSign, sid, Ui, (slj , st, d, Bπ)).
Ui updates the new local chain to be C′ = C|B, and sets the state st = H(head(C′)). Finally, Ui broadcasts the new
chain C′ if he has created a new block in this step.
Transaction Generation. When receiving the request (sign tx, sid′, tx) from the environment, Ui forwards the request
(Sign, sid, Ui, tx) to FDSIG, receives the returned (Signature, sid, tx, σ), and finally sends the message (signed tx,
sid′, tx, σ) to the environment.
Figure 3: Protocol π′SPoS
current signing keys sk as well as the internal state
(possibly empty) of the signing algorithm Sign as the
internal state of Ui.
Recall that Z can distinguish the real execution with A
and πΣ from an ideal execution with S and FPS, then we
demonstrate that the underlying Σ is forgeable by construct-
ing a forger G as follows. G runs a internal instance of Z ,
and simulates the interactions with S and FPS for Z , where
G acts as both S and FPS to Z . Moreover, in the simulating
process, like the case for S, Gwill also run a simulated copy
of A.
When G is activated, it returns the public key vk from
its own experiment to A. When Z activates US with input
(Sign, sid, US,m = m
′...), G calls its signing oracle with
m to obtain a signature σ, calls its puncture oracle with
m′ to update the secret keys, and then updates the punc-
turing set P = P ∪ {m′} and the set of queried messages
Qsig = Qsig ∪ {m}. When Z activates an uncorrupted party
with input (Verify, sid,m = m′..., σ, vk′), G checks whether
m ∈ Qsig, the signer is uncorrupted before m′ is punctured,
and Verify(vk′,m,σ) = 1. If all these conditions are met, then
in its experiment ExptpsG(1
λ), G outputsm′ as the challeng-
ing string, and makes series of queries as in Definition 4.
Eventually G outputs the tuple (m,σ), succeeding in the
experiment.
Denote by E the event that in a run of πΣ with Z ,
some party Ui is activated with a verification request
(Verify, sid,m=m′..., σ, vk′), where Verify(vk′,m, σ) = 1,
m /∈ Qsig, and US is not corrupted before m′ is punctured.
If E does not occur, Z would not distinguish between a real
and an ideal execution. However, we assume that Z can
distinguish real from ideal executions with non-negligible
advantage, and thus E also happens with non-negligible
advantage. Note that, from the view of Z and A, the
interaction with G looks the same as the interaction with
πΣ, which means that whenever E happens, a valid forgery
is outputted by G. 
4.2 Applications in Other Proof-of-Stake Protocols
As we have described above, most existing proof-of-stake
blockchain protocols are vulnerable to LRSL attack, and we
show that our puncturable signature construction can also
be applied in other Proof-of-stake blockchain protocols to
resist LRSL attack.
In both Ouroboros [12] and Snow White [13] proto-
cols, each block is signed by the leader using an ordi-
nary signature scheme and thus they cannot resist LRSL
attack. Fortunately, their signature schemes can also be
replaced by the puncturable signatures directly. Specifi-
cally, in Ouroborous, the leader Ui signs the block Bi by
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σ = Sign(skj , (slj , d, stj)) and updates the secret key of Ui
by Puncture(skj , slj), and the case in Snow White is similar
with the exception that the slot parameter is replaced with
the time step t. By this means, even if an adversary A ob-
tains the updated secret key, he cannot sign for other block
data d′ at the same slot sli or time step t, which furthermore
avoids the forks in blockchains and LRSL attack. In addition,
our puncturable signature also can be applied in Ouroboros
Genesis [22] protocol similar to Section 4.1.
4.3 On tolerating a non-negligible correctness error for
Proof-of-Stake Blockchain
The significant efficiency improvement of our PS construc-
tion stems partially from the relaxation of tolerating a non-
negligible correctness error, which, in turn, comes from the
non-negligible false-positive probability of a Bloom filter.
Specifically, the correctness error in our puncturable signa-
ture construction means that the signing of a message m
may yield ⊥ even though the secret key has never been
punctured at the prefix m′ of the message m. However, the
correctness error can be as small as possible by adjusting
the corresponding parameters in Bloom filter (see Section
2.1), which implies a trade-off between the non-negligible
correctness error and the size of secret keys.
For proof-of-stake blockchain, it is a reasonable approach
to accept a small, but non-negligible correctness error, in
exchange for the huge efficiency gain. In fact, existent
blockchain protocols achieve security properties (i.e. com-
mon prefix, chain quality and chain growth) with high
probability instead of certainty, which means a small error
probability is inherent in these protocols. Moreover, the
signing error would not affect the running of the blockchain
system. For instance, in Ouroboros [12], the stakeholder
selected as one of the leaders in current slot can still get
the reward even if his signing fails. While in Ouroboros
Praos [9] and Snow White [13], some slots might have
multiple slot leaders or no leader (i.e., empty slot), which
means the signing error for one leader would not affect the
protocol running.
4.4 Analysis and Comparison
For the proof-of-stake blockchain application, we make a
comparison between our puncturable signature and two
existing forward secure signatures, in terms of function-
ality and performance. First, puncturable signature allows
each leader to generate at most one block at any slot (by
puncturing at sli, the slot number of the current block),
and thus prevents attackers from compromising leaders to
mount LRSL attack. Although the forward secure signature
can achieve the same functionality by using different secret
key for signing in each period, their performance depends
on the number of time periods T (being set in advance) or
the time periods t elapsed so far, which is undesirable for the
blockchain application. More specifically, in each slot of the
proof-of-stake blockchain, only one stakeholder is elected as
the leader to propose and sign the block, which means some
stakeholders may only have a chance to sign block after long
slots (i.e. time periods), however, the computational cost of
one signature in this case may almost amount to that of
multiple regular signatures due to the dependence on T or t.
On the contrary, the puncturable signature can alleviate this
problem because the computation is independent of time
periods.
Second, keeping on the signing and verifying operation
as efficient as the underlying scheme is an important goal
for the forward-secure signatures as well as our puncturable
signatures. However, except for [10], almost all existing
forward secure signature schemes require longer time for
signing or verifying. Particularly, [20] [11] requires two ordi-
nary verification together with several hash computations,
and verification time in [21] [5] even grows linearly with
the number of periods T . Apparently, our construction can
retain the efficiency of the underlying scheme on signing
and verifying, with k additional hash computations.
Third, the key update time of [10] [11] depends on T
or t, which may bring some undesirable consumption and
even become a fatal issue for some particular applications.
Specifically, in the proof-of-stake blockchain, the signer may
not even do any signing within one period but he has to
update the signing key as long as the current period ends,
which makes the update operation a vain effort. In some
other applications, the signer has to update the secret key
immediately after one signing operation, leading to that the
number of update operations (i.e., T ) within a given validity
time of the public key becomes so large that the update
time is unacceptable. The key update in our puncturable
signature construction is independent on T or t, and only
needs k hash computations.
Finally, in Table 1 we compare the performance of our
construction with that of [10] and [11], which are most
efficient in existing forward secure signature schemes. We
use th, t
′
h, tm1, tm2, teT , tp, tmN , t
′
mN , teN and tpt to
denote the time for computing a universal hash, a hash
for Hj(j ∈ [k]) in Bloom filter, a multiplication in G1, a
multiplication in G2, an exponentiation in GT , a bilinear
pairing, a multiplication in Z∗N , a multiplication in ϕ(N), an
exponentiation in Z∗N and one primality test for one λ-bit
number, respectively. We also denote |Z∗p|, |Z
∗
N | and |G1| as
the bit-length of an element in Z∗p, an element in Z
∗
N and an
element in G1, respectively, where p is the order of G1.
The implementations are written in C using version 3
of AMCL [38] and compiled using gcc 5.4.0, and the pro-
gramme runs on a Lenovo ThinkCentre M8500t computer
with Ubuntu 16.04.9 (64 bits) system, equipped with a 3.40
GHz Intel Core i7-4770 CPU with 8 cores and 8GB memory.
Particularly, the AMCL library recommends two types of
BLS curves (i.e., BLS12 and BLS24) to support bilinear
pairings, and the curves have the form y2 = x3 + b defined
over a finite field Fq , with b = 15 and |q| = 383 for BLS12,
while b = 19 and |q| = 479 for BLS24, where q is a prime.
According to the analysis [39], BLS12 and BLS24 curves can
provide 128-bit and 192-bit security levels respectively. For
the group Z∗N , we choose |N | = 3072 and |N | = 7680
for 128-bit and 192-bit security levels respectively. For hash
function, we choose SHA-3844. In addition, we assume one
stakeholder can be leader for 103 times on average and
4. The hash function Hj(j ∈ [k]) in bloom filter can be simulated
by two hash functions according to the analysis in [40]. In practice, the
guava library [41] by Google employs Murmur3 hash [42] for Bloom
filter. For simplicity, we replaceMurmur3 with SHA-384 during the test,
however, our scheme would perform better using the faster Murmur3.
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TABLE 1: Efficiency comparison
Ours [10] [11]
Keygen time l · tm1 Tλtpt + T · t′mN + 3teN λteN
Sign time teT + tm1 + k.t
′
h + th 2 teN + tmN + th 2 teN + tmN + th
Verify time k.t′h + th + tp + teT + tm2 2 teN + tmN + th (4 teN + 2 tmN ) + (logλ+logt) th
Key update time k.t′h T · teN + Tλ · tpt t · teN
Secret key size l · e−k|P |/l|G1| 3|Z∗N |+ λ+ 2logT |Z
∗
N |+ λ · (logλ+ logt)
Public key size |G1| 2|Z
∗
N |+ logT λ
Signature size |Z∗p|+ |G1| |Z
∗
N |+ 2λ+ logT 4|Z
∗
N |+ λ(logλ+ logt)
TABLE 2: Experimental results comparison
Ours [10] [11]
128-bit 192-bit 128-bit 192-bit 128-bit 192-bit
Keygen time (ms) 5.19× 103 1.11× 104 6.92× 104 1.62× 105 378.88 3.40× 103
Sign time (ms) 1.17 5.61 5.92 35.41 5.92 35.41
Verify time (ms) 4.14 23.09 5.92 35.41 11.84 70.82
Key update time (ms) 10−5 10−5 3.65× 105 1.93× 106 2.96× 105 1.77× 106
Secret key size1
1.31×
e−|P |/1.44×10
3
M
1.64×
e−|P |/1.44×10
3
M
1.14KB 2.84KB 761.75B 1.51KB
Public key size 95.25B 119.50B 770.08B 1.88KB 16B 24B
Signature size 129.11B 169.35B 418.08B 1010.08B 1.87KB 4.32KB
1 The secret size decreases with puncturing operation. For 128-bit and 192-bit security level, the maximum is 1.31MB and 1.64M when
|P | = 0, and the minimum is 0.65M and 0.82M when |P | reaches its maximum (i.e., 103), respectively.
TABLE 3: Experimental cost of each unit operation (ms)
tm1 tm2 teT tp tmN t
′
mN teN tpt th t
′
h
128-bit 0.36 0.97 0.81 2.36 0.0035 0.00095 2.96 0.0054
2× 10−5 10−6
192-bit 0.77 6.93 4.84 11.32 0.011 0.0023 17.7 0.0084
set n = 103 in Bloom filter. Without loss of generality
we assume the average probability that one stakeholder
is selected as the leader in one slot is 1/100 (which is
large enough in practice)5, which means there are at least
105 slots in blockchain and set T = 105. We also set the
error probability pr = 1/1000 of Bloom filter, then we can
compute ℓ = −n ln pr(ln 2)2 = 1.44 × 10
4 and k = ⌈ ln ln 2⌉ = 10.
Note that t in [11] denotes the time periods elapsed, also the
number of signed operations so far, so we set t = 105 to
evaluate the worst case.
Table 2 summarizes the experiment results, where the
time represents the average time for 100 runs of each opera-
tion and the experimental cost of each basic operation over
recommended groups at different security levels is shown in
Table 3. The results show that our scheme performs better
on signing and verification efficiency, significantly on key
update efficiency. Moreover, our scheme has the smallest
signature size, which drastically reduces the communica-
tion complexity for proof-of-stake blockchain. In addition,
key generation in our scheme can be further optimized
by pre-computing some exponentiations off-line. However,
the initial secret key size in our scheme is large due to
the Bloom filter. Fortunately, the secret key size shrinks
5. Note that we just choose the specific parameters to carry out the
efficiency comparison. For larger n and T , the efficiency of our scheme
remains unchanged except that the time for key generation and secret
size would increase according to Table 1, and thus the advantage of
our scheme over forward secure signature schemes in the aspect of
sign/verify/key update time as well as signature size still holds.
with increasing amount of signing operations. In practice,
the secret keys are stored locally on personal equipments,
and reducing computation complexity and communication
complexity may be more important with the rapid advance
of storage technology.
5 CONCLUSION
Although the notion of puncturable signatures has been
proposed before, this is the first work that makes it effi-
cient enough to be deployed in practice. We proposed a
construction approach based on Bloom filter, whose punc-
turing operation only involves a small number of efficient
computations (e.g. hashing), which outperforms previous
schemes by orders of magnitude. Next, we used puncturable
signature to construct practical proof-of-stake blockchain
protocol resilient to LRSL attack. Our motivation stems
from the observation that LRSL attack can alter transactions
history and furthermore hamper the development of proof-
of-stake blockchain. Our construction allows to realize prac-
tical blockchain protocol, and experiment results show that
our scheme performs significantly on communication and
computation efficiency.
How to design efficient puncturable signature without
Bloom filter is a worthwhile direction. We believe that
puncturable signature will find applications beyond proof-
of-stake blockchain protocols.
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